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Abstract
I refer to as a direct sale of ﬁnancial information any case in which the end users of the
information get to observe the information before they decide to act on it. This paper
investigates the conditions under which a possessor of valuable information may prefer to sell
her information instead of trading on it. The sale of information has an important commit-
ment e#ect in that it credibly commits a risk neutral possessor of information to a strategy
which promotes more intense competition among informed traders in the market and makes
the trading strategies of other informed traders less aggressive. It is this strategic externality
that makes the selling of information an optimal strategy. The model in this paper shows that
if the security price does not fully reﬂect the private information of all the traders, diluting the
seller’s information before selling it is not optimal even if the seller trades on her own account
while selling her information. The price of information in equilibrium is such that privately
informed traders never ﬁnd it optimal to purchase additional information from the seller. It is
also shown that if the information seller is more risk averse than her clients, then she ﬁnds it
optimal to commit not to trade on the basis of her information.
Keywords: Information sales,Strategic trading, Strategic substitution, Risk allocation
JEL classiﬁcation: D82; G104
I. Introduction
Participants in ﬁnancial markets typically have access to a wide variety of ﬁnancial
services whose providers claim to help clients achieve better results from their trading
activities. Examples of such services for sale include investment newsletters, private banking
services, and ﬁnancial consultants’ and brokers’ advice. The gamut of these ﬁnancial services
may be thought of as constituting an information market. This paper focuses on one element
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also appreciate Professors Rick Green, Duane Seppi, Bart Lipman, Murugappa Krishnan and an anonymous
referee for their constructive suggestions. Financial support from William Larimer Mellon Fund, Margaret and
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Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 46 (2005), pp.41-63.  Hitotsubashi Universityof this market-the direct sale of ﬁnancial information; the sale of information by a mechanism
like the subscription to an investment newsletter of limited circulation.
I refer to direct sale of information as any case in which the end user of the information
gets to observe the information before he decides to act on it. Thus, delegated portfolio
management through a mutual fund manager for a fee is not covered by the deﬁnition of a
direct sale mechanism.
1 The typical question that confronts an information seller in a ﬁnancial
market is why she has to resort to the sale of information if she could directly trade on it
herself and, presumably, make greater proﬁts thereby. This paper investigates the conditions
under which a possessor of valuable information may prefer to sell her information instead of
trading on her own account. In addition, this paper explores the nature of the optimal sales
strategy under di#erent structures and the e#ect of sales of information on the welfare of other
market participants.
First, it is established that for a risk neutral possessor of information who has monopolis-
tic access to information about a ﬁnancial security, it is more proﬁtable to trade on the
information than to sell it. This conclusion is based on the assumption that trading in securities
can be achieved in an anonymous fashion. Once the strong assumption of monopolistic access
to information is removed, it may no longer be optimal for an information possessor to abjure
the direct sale of her information. In fact, the sale of information to clients who will then
optimally use the information to decide their trading strategies has important e#ects on the
nature of trading in the ﬁnancial markets; this gives rise to incentives to sell information rather
than trade on it directly. Such a sale of information has important commitment e#ects in that
it credibly commits the information possessor to a strategy that would not be credible if she
were to avoid such sales. Intuitively, the sale of information to a number of clients provides for
more intense competition in the ﬁnancial market. While this does reduce the total proﬁts
available to informed traders as a group, it also has the e#ect of making the trading strategies
of other information-based traders less aggressive. As a result, although the reduction in
overall proﬁts from trading may be substantial, the individual seller of information does not
bear the full cost of the reduction in overall proﬁts. This strategic externality may make the
selling of information an optimal strategy for the possessor of information.
The issue of selling information in the context of ﬁnancial markets has been analyzed by
Admati & Pﬂeiderer (1986, 1988) in two papers. In Admati & Pﬂeiderer (1986), they show
that in a competitive rational expectations setup, the optimal way to sell information is to make
it coarser by means of adding ‘personalized noise’ to the information. This addition of noise
prevents full revelation of information by the market price in the rational expectations
equilibrium, and thus preserves the value of private information. In Admati & Pﬂeiderer
(1988), they show that it may be optimal for a monopolistic risk averse information possessor
to sell her information in order to achieve better risk sharing.
The analysis in this paper yields results that are di#erent from those of Admati and
Pﬂeiderer, due to the use of a strategic model of ﬁnancial market trading. In such a model,
given the speciﬁed sequence of moves on the part of various players, the ﬁnal price never
reveals the information in full as in a competitive rational expectations framework, and it may
indeed be optimal to sell information even without appealing to risk sharing considerations. In
particular, this paper also shows that it is optimal for the seller never to dilute her information
1 Please refer to Bhattacharya & Pﬂeiderer(1985) for the analysis of delegated portfolio management.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H .,by the addition of noise, whether ‘personalized’ or not, even if she trades on her own account
as well. Thus, the results in this paper mitigate the objection that the optimal strategy
established may be illegal due to discrimination amongst customers. In fact, given the moral
hazard problems typically associated with the sale of ﬁnancial information for trading, it is
likely that the sale of information with added ‘personalized’ noise is indistinguishable from the
sale of spurious information. While the moral hazard problems are not directly focused, in this
model all buyers of information are allowed to check that the information seller treated them
equally well.
Fishman & Hagerty (1995) and Sabino (1993) also investigate the incentive for the sales
of information. There are two major di#erences between Fishman & Hagerty (1995) and this
paper. Firstly, in Fishman & Hagerty (1995), the sequence of the game is as follows: (i) the
market maker chooses the price schedule; (ii) given the price schedule, information seller
decides the optimal information selling strategy; (iii) trading of securities commences. In this
sequence of game, no matter what sales strategy is taken by the information seller, the price
schedule chosen by the market maker does not change and consequently market liquidity is not
a#ected by the sale of information. However, in this paper and Sabino (1993), the ﬁrst two
stages are reversed, and considering the e#ect of information sales on the market liquidity, the
information seller optimally decides the strategy of information sales. As will be shown in the
following section, the condition for the information sales is not a#ected by the sequence of the
game, but di#erent implications on the welfare of liquidity traders are derived. Secondly, and
more importantly, the model in this paper has fewer restriction than Fishman & Hagerty
(1995) and Sabino (1993): the information seller is allowed to dilute her information before
sales and she can also trade on her account while selling her information. In addition, other
information-based traders can purchase information from the seller and enhance the precision
of their information. This paper demonstrates that diluting the seller’s information before
selling it is not optimal even if the seller trades on her own account while selling her
information, and the price of information in equilibrium is such that privately informed
traders never ﬁnd it optimal to purchase additional information from the seller. Therefore, the
results derived in this paper are a lot stronger than those from Fishman & Hagerty (1995) and
Sabino (1993).
The model is extended to the case where the information seller and her clients are risk
averse. In addition to the strategic externality that can be caused by the sales of information,
the seller can achieve better risk sharing through the sales of information. Since the value of
information is higher to the less risk averse trader, if the information seller is more risk averse
than her clients, then she ﬁnds it optimal to commit not to trade on her own account.
Therefore, the sales of information has the function of allocating information to the traders
who value most.
As mentioned above, this paper does not deal with the moral hazard aspect of the sale of
ﬁnancial information. That issue is the focus of a paper by Allen (1990), in which he shows
that in order to convince the buyer of the veracity of the information, the seller may have to
make her own wealth contingent on the price outcome of the security about which she claims
to have private information. The model in this paper, on the other hand, is based on the
assumption that the buyers of information can costlessly verify whether the seller has engaged
in adequate information gathering or not, although the precise outcome of the investigative
process is not directly observable to the buyer. The analysis in this paper is related to that of
2005] 9>G:8I H6A:H D; ;>C6C8>6A >C;DGB6I>DC 7N 6 BDCDEDA>HI>8 H:AA:G .-Kamien & Tauman (1986), in which the single patent holder of a cost reducing innovation in
a product market ﬁnds it optimal to license unless he is a monopolist in the product market.
Kane & Marks (1990) and Brennan & Chordia (1993) compare direct sales of information to
other methods of indirect sales of information. Kane & Marks (1990) shows that in the
presence of borrowing constraints, investors prefer direct sales of information. In Brennan &
Chordia (1993), di#erent ways to charge customers of information sales are compared.
The rest of this paper is organized in four sections. Section 2 presents the basic model of
the ﬁnancial market which will be used throughout the paper. The model is an adaptation of
the model in Kyle (1985), and the condition for the sales of information is derived. The basic
model introduced in Section 2 will be generalized in Section 3. The case of risk averse
information seller and her clients are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses directions for
future research and conclusions. Most of the proofs are presented in Appendix.
II. Basic model
A single risky security is traded in a ﬁnancial market. The ex post payo# of this security,
denoted u . , is normally distributed with mean u 2and precision (inverse of variance) of hu.A l l
participants in the ﬁnancial market are assumed to be risk neutral. A monopolistic information
seller has costless access to a private observation of u .without any noise. The information seller
can either trade on her own account or sell her information, but she is not allowed to do both.
There are n speculators, who are not allowed to buy information from the information
seller. Any trader who trades on the information obtained by studying the market by himself
is termed a speculator. Arbitrageurs and fund managers working for brokerage ﬁrms and
investment banks, and even insiders, are included in this group. The speculators’ information
is less precise that the information seller’s in that each speculator i privately observes the noisy
signal of u . , u . h . i, i  1,2,…, n. It is assumed that {h . i}i1,2,…, n are mutually independent normal
random variables independent of u .with mean 0 and precision hh.
Let u ˜denote the net market order of liquidity traders, where u ˜is normally distributed
with mean 0 and precision hu, and independent of u .and {h . i}i1,2,…, n’s. Liquidity traders buy or
sell a certain number of shares for exogenous reasons such as immediate consumption or tax
purposes. Institutional investors such as insurance companies and pension funds which have
stochastic inﬂux and outﬂow of their assets can be included in this group. Even if they have
information about the payo# of the security, this may not a#ect the size of their trading orders.
Su$ciently many outside investors have neither liquidity demand nor any information
about u . , and they are potential clients of the information seller. Finally, a competitive market
maker takes the net trading orders that clear the market, and determines the price of the
security. The number of speculators and the statistical properties of u . ,{ h . i}i1,2,…, n and u ˜are
common knowledge.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ..The sequence of trading is as follows. In period zero, information about u .may be sold to
outside investors. In period one, trading takes place in the market. In the last period, u .is
publicly revealed, and payo# of the security is given to security holders. Sequence of trading
is given in Figure (1).
If the information seller decides to sell her information, then in period zero, she
announces the price and the precision of the information to be sold. For simplicity, it is
assumed that the information seller is restricted to sell her information ‘as is’ without adding
any noise, which will be relaxed in the next section. Outside investors who choose to become
clients of the information seller pay for the service, and then they privately observe the
information. Subsequently, they base their trading strategies on the purchased information.
Since the information seller is a monopolist, and there are su$ciently many potential
clients for each price and precision of the information, the equilibrium number of clients is
uniquely determined such that the expected trading proﬁt of each client equals the price that
he pays for the information. The clients of the information seller purchase the unrestricted use
of the seller’s information in trading securities, but resale of the information is assumed to be
prohibited.
2 The incentive problems of the information seller will not be discussed in this
paper, and it is assumed that if the information is sold, it is communicated truthfully. The price
and the precision of information sold by the information seller are all common knowledge, and
the equilibrium number of clients are correctly inferred by all the market participants.
3
2 While information sellers are likely to be established ﬁnancial institutions with reputation and long-term
relationship with their current and future customers, clients of information seller tend to be general investors who
cannot credibly convince other investors of the quality of the information they try to resell. Since the analysis of
this paper is based on one-period model in which the information is assumed to be short-lived, in addition to the
clients’ lack of credibility, it is conceivable that information buyers cannot have enough time to resell their
purchased information to other investors before trading begins.
3 As is analyzed in the remainder of this paper, the price of the information and the total proﬁt earned by the
seller crucially depends on the number of information buyers. The assumption that the equilibrium number of
clients is correctly inferred by all market participants is critical for the existence of equilibrium in this model.
Suppose the seller sets the price of the information claiming that it would be sold to K clients. If the seller is the
F><.1 T>B:A>C:
Information seller announces the price of the information, and it is sold to her clients.
Informed traders observe realization of signal on u . .
Market makers announce price schedules.
Liquidity demands are realized, and traders submit market orders.
Price at time t is set by the market maker.
Market observes u . .
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all the available public information. Then, traders place their market orders to the market
maker, who takes the aggregate net trading order to clear the market and sets the price such
that he expects to earn zero proﬁts. The market maker is assumed to observe only the aggregate
net trading order, denoted y ˜ , and not the individual trading orders submitted. As in Kyle
(1985), the price schedule set by the market maker satisﬁes the following equation thanks to
the zero expected proﬁts condition induced by the competition on the trading ﬂoor:
P  u 2 ly ˜ E[u . y ˜ ]. (1)
Both speculators and clients of the information seller are information-based traders who
trade on their private information to earn trading proﬁts. l is a measure of market liquidity
and it represents how sensitively price moves as net trading order submitted to the market
maker changes. The equilibrium l is determined by the number of two di#erent types of
information-based traders and the precision of their information. The information seller is a
leader of this trading game in that she is able to a#ect the equilibrium l, and consequently
inﬂuence the trading strategy of all the information-based traders. The instrument she uses to
do this is the price that she announces for access to her information.
The model presented in this section is a modiﬁcation of Kyle (1985), and it has a couple
of important characteristics, which lead to the results of this paper. First, in this model, the
seller’s information cannot be leaked to non-clients before trading commences by being
reﬂected in the price of the risky security. When traders place their market orders, they only
observe the price schedule, not the actual price. Therefore, they decide the size of their trading
orders only on the basis of their own information or their liquidity demand, taking into
account the e#ects of their trading orders on the price.
Second, the price cannot fully reﬂect all traders’ private information, and the market can
never collapse due to the presence of the traders with perfect information. This is because the
market maker is not able to distinguish random liquidity demand separately from trading
orders of other traders who trade on the basis of their information.
In the following analysis, the factors that make the monopolistic information seller choose
to sell her information, rather than keeping it to herself and trading on it, are going to be
investigated. When selling information is desirable, optimal sale strategy is characterized.
Suppose the seller determines the price to charge for access to her information such that
m outside investors pay the price for it, and become her clients. Given the number of
speculators and the precision of their information, let P(m[n, hh]) denote the expected
trading proﬁt of each individual client. Since the seller is a monopolist in the market for
information, and there are su$ciently many outside investors who are potential clients of the
information seller, the seller is able to charge the price of information such that she can fully
extract the expected trading proﬁt to be earned by her clients. Thus, P(m[n, hh]) is also the
only one who correctly knows the number of information buyers, then she has an incentive to sell her information
secretly to additional clients on the side after the ﬁrst round of sales. This obviously debases the value of
information to the clients who purchase the information in the ﬁrst round, and being aware of this possibility,
clients would refuse to pay the price set by the seller and the equilibrium cannot be sustained. Therefore, market
participants’ ability to correctly infer the number of information buyers is a critical condition for the existence of
the equilibrium of this model. This type of cheating on the part of the seller is less likely to happen if the seller is
established ﬁnancial institution whose reputation and long-term relationship with its customers are at stake.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H .0price of the information, and the seller’s total proﬁt from information sales is mP(m[n, hh]).
Her problem is equivalent to choosing the optimal number of clients, denoted m*, to maximize
her total proﬁt mP(m[n, hh]).
4 Equilibrium is derived by backward induction, and following
lemma presents the equilibrium in trading stage.
Lemma 1 1. Given the price schedule P(y ˜ )  u 2 ly ˜ , the information seller’s clients and
speculators place the following market orders respectively.
hh2hu
l[(m1)(hh2hu)nhh]
(u . u 2 ). (2)
hh
l[(m1)(hh2hu)nhh)]
(u . h . iu 2 )i  1,2,…, n (3)












3. The total proﬁt that the information seller expects to earn is
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Proof: Suppose information buyers and speculators are believed to take trading strategies of
a(u . u 2 )a n db(u . h . iu 2 ) respectively. Given P  u 2 ly ˜ , u .and trading strategies of other
buyers and speculators, an infomration buyer determines his optimal trading strategy by
solving following optimization problem.
ma
xxE[x(u . u 2 l(x(m1)a(u . u 2 ) S
n
i  1
b(u . h . iu 2 )u))u . ]
The ﬁrst order condition yields
x*  u . u 2
2l
[1l(m1)alnb]
For the consistent belief to hold in equilibrium, x*  a(u . u 2 ) should be satisﬁed, and
following equality is obtained from it.
1  l(m1)alnb (6)
Similarly, a speculator’s optimal trading strategy is derived from following maximization
problem taking P  u 2 ly ˜ , u . h . i and trading strategies of other buyers and speculators.
ma
z xE[z(u . u 2 l(zma(u . u 2 )S
n
ji
b(u . h . ju 2 )u))u . h . i]
4 In this paper only m1 are considered, and for simplicity, the integer problem is ignored.
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z* 






















By solving simulataneous equations of (6) and (7), equilibrium trading strategies in equations
(2) and (3) are obtained. Expected trading proﬁt earned by each informed trader is
P[m(m, hh)]  E[a(u . u 2 )(u . u 2 l(ma(u . u 2 )S
n
i1
b(u . h . iu 2 )u))]
which is given in equation (5). From equation (1) and y ˜ ma(u . u 2 )S
n
i1b (u . h . iu 2 )u,
the price schedule satisﬁes
P  E[u . y ˜ ]  u 2 ly ˜
 u 2  Cov(u . , y ˜ )
Var(y ˜ )
y ˜
and from equations (2) and (3), equilibrium l in equation (4) is derived. 
Note that either n  0o rhh  0 means that there are no speculators in the market, and
that m  1 is equivalent to information seller choosing to keep her information to herself and
trade on it rather than sell it to outside investors. As a leader in this game in period zero, given
the number of speculators and the precision of their information, the information seller
determines the optimal number of her clients to maximize her proﬁt, taking into account the
price schedule to be set by the market maker in period one.
Proposition 1 below demonstrates that the seller’s decision to sell her information or trade
on it depends on whether she has monopolistic access to the information about u .or not.
Proposition 1 1. A monopolistic seller of information obtains the highest proﬁt by trading on her
information instead of selling it if she also has monopolistic access to information.
2. A monopolistic seller of information is able to obtain a higher proﬁt by selling her
information instead of keeping it to herself and trading on it when she is not a monopolistic
owner of information.
A proof of the ﬁrst part of Proposition 1 is given in Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988), and a
similar proof applies in the context of this paper. Any market participants who trade on their
private information regarding u .are termed ‘informed traders’, and they all expect to earn
positive trading proﬁts. The total trading proﬁt they expect to make will be called the ‘market
trading proﬁt’. Since the seller is the monopolist in the market for information, her share of the
market trading proﬁt is her clients’ total expected trading proﬁt which is extracted by the price
charged for the information.
5
5 Since the seller commits to sell her information ‘as is’ without adding any noise and she fully extracts the
expected trading proﬁts to be earned by her clients by charging a price equal to P(m[n, hh]), the total proﬁt she
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information about u . , and either the seller or her clients are the only ones who trade on the
information regarding u . depending on the seller’s decision and, therefore, her total proﬁt
mP(m) is exactly equal to the market trading proﬁt. Clearly, the seller’s proﬁt mP(m)i s
decreasing in m, and her proﬁt is maximized if she does not sell her information to anyone in
the market. The intuition here leads to the same outcome as in the Cournot oligopoly model
where industry proﬁts are decreasing in a number of identical ﬁrms. The sale of information
creates unnecessary competition among her clients, and the proﬁt from the sale of information
always falls short of the seller’s proﬁt which could be earned by trading on her information
without selling it. Therefore, it is desirable for her to keep the information to herself and trade
on it instead of selling it. The following proposition speciﬁes a set of conditions under which
the seller ﬁnds it optimal to sell her information.
If the seller does not have monopolistic access to information, she has to face competition
from speculators. This forces her to share the market trading proﬁts with the speculators. Since
the seller is not able to appropriate the entire market trading proﬁt by herself, her objective
now is to maximize her share, not the market trading proﬁt itself.
6
The condition for the information seller to sell her information rather than to keep it to
herself and trade on it is similar to the one derived in Fishman & Hagerty (1995) and Sabino
(1993) although the sequence of game assumed in Fishman & Hagerty (1995) is di#erent from
this model. In Fishman & Hagerty (1995), information sellers decide her sales strategy after
market maker announces price schedule, and no matter what sales strategy is taken by the
information seller, the price schedule chosen by the market maker does not change and
consequently market liquidity is not a#ected by the sales of information. However, in this
paper and Sabino (1993), the sequence of game is such that market maker chooses price
schedule given the seller’s sales strategy, and consequently market liquidity is clearly a#ected
by how widely information is sold to outside investors. In period zero, the information seller
optimally decides the strategy of information sales considering the e#ect of information sales
on the market liquidity. Unlike Fishman & Hagerty (1995), this model demonstrates that the
sales of information a#ects the welfare of every market participant including liquidity traders.
Since liquidity traders’ expected trading loss is
l
hu
, sales of information directly a#ect the
welfare of liquidity traders in that as the information is sold more widely, due to more intense
competition among information-based traders, liquidity traders are better o# with smaller
expected trading loss.
7
The sale of information to clients who will then optimally use the information to decide
their trading strategies has an important commitment e#ect in that it credibly commits the
information seller to a strategy that would not be credible if she were to avoid such sales. The
expects to make by selling her information to m-1 clients and trading on her own account is exactly same as that
by selling her information to m clients without being engaged in any trading herself.
6 The analysis is conducted based on the strategic trading model in which traders allowed to submit only market
orders. The condition for the seller to ﬁnd the sales of her information optimal is that mP(m) does not decrease
monotonically, and Proposition 1 shows that it is true in case that traders submit market orders. Although it is
conjectured that the same result would be obtained in other trading mechanisms such as limit orders, formal
analysis is left for further research.
7 This can be easily shown from equation (4) since l is a decreasing function of m.
2005] 9>G:8I H6A:H D; ;>C6C8>6A >C;DGB6I>DC 7N 6 BDCDEDA>HI>8 H:AA:G .3sale of information to a number of clients provides for more intense competition in the
ﬁnancial market. While this does reduce the market trading proﬁts, it also has the e#ect of
making the trading strategies of speculators less aggressive. This is actually the ‘strategic
substitutability’ in the sense of Bulow, Geanokoplos and Klemperer (1985). Although the
reduction in overall market trading proﬁts may be substantial, the seller of information does
not bear the full cost of the reduction in the market trading proﬁts. By selling her information
to a number of clients, the information seller is able to make the trading strategy of the
speculators less aggressive and increase her share of the market trading proﬁts at the expense
of the speculators’ proﬁt. It is this strategic externality that makes the sales of information an
optimal strategy for the information seller.
A natural question is why the information seller herself does not place the same size of
trading order as the one collectively submitted by herself and by her clients, instead of selling
information. Notice that if the information seller decides not to sell her information, this then
becomes a quantity game simultaneously played by n speculators and the information seller. In
this game, once trading begins, the information seller does not have any strategic advantage
against other informed traders, and cannot credibly commit herself to a trading strategy of
placing collective trading orders by her and her clients under the information sales scenario
because that cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium anymore.
8 However, by selling her
information to outside investors, which is observable to speculators and the market maker, the
information seller is able to ascertain herself as leader of this trading game in that she can
manage to a#ect the equilibrium l, and consequently inﬂuence the trading strategy of all the
information-based traders. The instrument she uses to do this is the price that she announces
for access to her information, and she can credibly commit herself to a strategy that makes the
speculators’ trading strategy less aggressive.
In Admati & Pﬂeiderer (1988), only a risk averse information seller chooses to sell her
information for the purpose of better risk sharing with her clients. As shown in Proposition 1,
however, even with a risk neutral information seller, the presence of other information owners
in the market justiﬁes her decision to sell her information, and she obtains higher proﬁts by
committing herself to a strategy that promotes more intense competition in the market.
9
Although it is assumed that the seller observes u .without any noise, the seller’s decision to sell
8 Suppose the seller trades on her own account instead of selling her information. It is a special case of Lemma
1 with m1. Then, it is now a quantity game played by n speculators and the information seller who now become
another informed trader. The seller decides her optimal trading strategy given other informed traders’ trading
strategy by solving maxa« Ps(a, b1, b2,,bn), where « Ps is the expected trading proﬁt earned by the seller and bi is
the trading strategy taken by speculator i. The equilibrium trading strategies taken by the seller and speculators
are given in equations (2) and (3) respectively with m 1, and it is clear that placing collective orders by the
seller and her clients is not the seller’s optimal strategy anymore. Kane & Marks(1990) analyze the game among
speculators in a set-up in which one speculator becomes a Stackelberg leader who can credibly commit to a
particular trading strategy at the beginning of game, and force other speculators to adjust their trading strategy
accordingly. Analysis in this paper is di#erent from Kane & Marks(1990) in that this paper assumes that once
trading stage begins, there is no endogenous mechanism that enables the information seller to become Stackelberg
leader of speculators.
9 This is quite a contrast to Admati & Pﬂeiderer(1988). They demonstrate that if either information seller or
outsider investor is su$ciently risk tolerant (i.e., close to risk neutral), it is optimal to have only one informed
trader in the market. However, Proposition 1 implies that if the seller and outside investors are risk neutral, it is
always optimal to increase the number of informed traders in the market unless the seller is the monopolistic
owner of the information.
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selling her information which makes the trading strategy of the speculators less aggressive. In
particular, even if the seller’s information is coarser than the speculators’ information, she will
still choose to sell her information since this promotes the information-based competition in
the market, by which she is able to obtain higher proﬁts.
These results were derived under the set of restrictive assumptions on the strategies of the
players in the game. In the following section, it is shown that the results follow even when
some of these assumptions are relaxed.
III. Extensions of the Basic Model
In the last section, the condition for the sales of information was derived under rather
restrictive set of assumptions: (i) information seller can either trade on her account or sell her
information, but she is not allowed to do both, (ii) if she sells her information, she is restricted
to sell her information ‘as is’ without adding any noise to it, and (iii) speculators are not
permitted to purchase information from the seller. In this section, it will be shown that the
equilibrium obtained in the previous section does not change even if these three assumptions
are relaxed. Put di#erently, it will be shown that in equilibrium speculators never ﬁnd it
optimal to purchase information from the seller and improve the precision of their informa-
tion, and it is always optimal for the information seller not to dilute her information before
selling it even when she trades on her own account.
In the last section, it is assumed that conditional on the sale of information, the seller is
restricted to sell her information ‘as is.’ Suppose she is allowed to sell signals of lower precision
which she generates by adding to her original signal a realization of mutually independent
noise terms. Now, in period zero, the information seller is supposed to announce the statistical
properties of the added noise along with the price of the information. In this case, although
clients purchase the signals of the same precision, they may observe di#erent signals and thus
submit di#erent trading orders.
10
Suppose the information seller trades on her own account and sells the information of
precision he by adding to her original signal of u .a realization of mutually independent noise
terms to generate each of the signals to be sold. The price of information is set such that in
equilibrium information is sold to z outside investors, and k speculators purchase information
from the seller to improve the precision of their information by he. The total number of clients,
zk is denoted m. Each client privately observes u . e . j, j  1, …, m where {e . j}j  1, …, m are
10 Another way of generating signals of lower precision is to add the noise before selling her information so that
all of her clients observe the same signal and submit the same sized trading orders. In Admati & Pﬂeiderer(1986),
this way of adding noise is called ‘photocopied noise,’ and the way assumed in this paper is labeled ‘personalized
noise.’ Admati & Pﬂeiderer(1986) show that the information seller obtains higher proﬁt by adding personalized
noise than by adding photocopied noise to her information before selling it. Unlike signals with personalized noise,
the signals with photocopied noise lead all clients to submit the identical size of trading orders to the market
maker. The market maker is then able to extract more information about u . by looking at the size of the net
market order, and the price schedule is more sensitive to the net market order. That is why signals with photocop-
ied noise generate smaller trading proﬁts for the seller’s clients than signals with personalized noise, which results
in smaller information sales proﬁt for the seller. The same result can be proved in the context of this model but is
omitted for the brevity of the model.
2005] 9>G:8I H6A:H D; ;>C6C8>6A >C;DGB6I>DC 7N 6 BDCDEDA>HI>8 H:AA:G /+normally distributed with mean 0 and precision he, and they are independent of u . ,{ h . i}i  1, …, n
and u ˜ . Notice it is assumed that the information seller cannot observe the realizations of
{e . j}j  1, …, m and resale of information is prohibited.
11
Also, the seller cannot charge discriminatory price against speculators, and therefore
every information buyer pays the same price for the information purchased from the seller.
If k speculators out of n purchase information from the seller, then there are four types
of information-based traders in the market: (i) information seller with perfect information on
u . , (ii) z outside investors who purchase the information of precision he, (iii) nk speculators
with the private information of precision hh, and (iv) k speculators with the information of
precision hehh by observing two pieces of signals.
Given (he, m) and (hh, n), the expected trading proﬁts of each trader depend on the
number of the speculators who purchase information. Let P
ib(k, z), P
ub(k, z)a n dP
i(k, z)
denote the expected trading proﬁts of a speculator with extra information, that of a seller’s
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In the previous section, it was assumed that speculators cannot have any access to the
seller’s information. If speculators are also allowed to purchase the seller’s information, they
are given the option of improving their information with the help of the seller’s information,
and thereby, of increasing their trading proﬁts. The question is whether such improvement in
the speculators’ information is worth the price. The next proposition shows that the answer is
no.
Proposition 2 Speculators never ﬁnd it optimal to purchase the seller’s information and improve
the precision of their information.
Suppose that, in equilibrium, the seller’s clients include some speculators as well as outside
investors. The information seller cannot charge discriminatory price to her clients, and every
information buyer pays the same price. Since there are su$ciently many outside investors, in
equilibrium, the number of clients who used to be an outside investor is determined such that
what they pay for the information equals exactly to their expected trading proﬁt. Due to the
decreasing marginal returns of information, speculators cannot increase their expected trading
11 Admati & Pﬂeiderer (1986) explains that “Signals may be personalized in other, less direct ways. For
example, the seller may provide information that is vague and open to interpretation, so that the buyers themselves
make personal, independent, errors of interpretation.’’. If noise is added in this way, each buyer interprets the
information provided by the seller di#erently and the seller cannot possibly know how each buyer interprets the
information.
12 For the derivations of T and Q, please refer to the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix.
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purchases information from the seller regardless of the precision and the price of the seller’s
information.
Fishman & Hagerty (1995) assume that both speculators and information seller have the
perfect information on the payo# of the security, which e#ectively rules out the possibility of
speculators’ purchasing information from the seller. If speculators’ information is less than
perfect, then they could increase their expected trading proﬁt by improving the precision of
their information with extra pieces of information purchased from the seller. As Proposition
2 shows, due to the large number of outside investors who earn greater marginal return from
the purchased information than the speculators, regardless of precision of the information sold
by the seller, there is no speculator purchasing information from the seller.
If the seller herself is also a trader in the market, as information of higher precision is
provided, there might exist a tradeo# between her own trading proﬁt and the proﬁt from
information sales. By creating more intense competition in the market, the seller’s own trading
proﬁt might su#er. In order to maximize her total proﬁt from trading and information sales,
the seller may have an incentive to sell information of lower precision by adding noise to her
information before selling it.
Suppose the seller provides information of precision he to m clients by adding personalized
noise, and she trades on her own account as well. The seller’s total proﬁt from trading and the
sale of information is given by the next equation.
13
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As the next proposition shows, in spite of this tradeo#, the seller’s proﬁt is maximized by
selling her information ‘as is’ without adding any noise to it.
Proposition 3 The information seller never ﬁnds it optimal to add any noise to her information
before selling it.
Proposition 3 contrasts with Admati & Pﬂeiderer (1986) in which the seller with very
precise information prefers to add personalized noise to her information before selling it. In
their paper, based on a rational expectations model, the information purchased by clients is
leaked to non-clients by being reﬂected in the price before trading commences. As more precise
information is sold by the seller, the price carries more of her information due to her clients’
more aggressive use of it, causing faster deterioration of its value and even market breakdown.
To prevent market collapse, the precision of the information sold to the clients needs to be
lower than a critical level. Since more noise needs to be added as the seller’s information gets
better, the seller cannot fully exploit her improved information for her proﬁt. Since the added
noise terms are independent random variables, they observe di#erent signals and submit
di#erent sized trading orders to the market maker although information sold to the seller’s
clients has the same precision. Therefore, it is even possible that some clients make ex post
trading proﬁts while others su#er ex post losses.
13 Equilibrium l
s is derived in the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
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speculators before trading commences, and price cannot fully carry traders’ private informa-
tion thanks to the random liquidity demand which is exogenous noise in the market. As more
precise information is sold to the seller’s clients, the value of information increases without
ever causing market collapse. Therefore, the seller is able to sell the best information she
possibly can, and obtains the highest proﬁt possible by selling her information ‘as is’ without
adding any noise. In addition, her clients make exactly the same ex post as well as ex ante
trading proﬁts because they observe identical information and submit exactly the same sized
trading orders.
Proposition 3 shows that once the seller decides to sell her information, it is sold to more
than one client, and the information sales proﬁt always makes up a larger portion of her total
proﬁts than her own trading proﬁt. Therefore, maximizing her information sales proﬁt helps
maximize her total proﬁts as well.
Proposition 3 is a lot stronger than a related result in Admati & Pﬂeiderer (1988) and
Fishman & Hagerty (1995), where the seller is restricted not to dilute her information. But
Proposition 3 demonstrates that even if there is no such restriction imposed on the seller, and
she is allowed to dilute her information before selling it while she trades on her own
information, the seller still never ﬁnds it optimal to dilute her information before selling it.
There are a couple of important implications derived from Proposition 3. First, the seller
trades on exactly the same information as that sold to her clients. This implies that her
expected trading proﬁt is equal to that of each of her clients which is the price she charges for
the information. Therefore, the total proﬁt she expects to make by selling her information to
m1 clients and trading on her own account is exactly same as that by selling her information
to m clients without being engaged in any trading herself. In equilibrium, as far as the seller
communicates honestly there are the same number of traders in the market who trade on the
seller’s information whether the seller utilizes both options or not. Second, if the statistical
properties of the seller’s information and her decision on the sale of her information are
common knowledge, one of the incentive problems on the part of the information seller can be
avoided. Since the seller trades after she is paid for her information, in order to increase her
trading proﬁt, she has an incentive to cheat her clients by actually providing the information
with lower precision than the one for which they pay. Suppose the seller is restricted to
choosing between selling her information and trading on it, and not allowed to do both.
Proposition 3 shows that as long as the seller communicates honestly with her clients, this
restriction does not change the seller’s total proﬁt. Since the seller no longer trades when she
sells her information, she has no reason to cheat her clients, and her information is communi-
cated honestly. Thus, this model is able to provide a strong answer to the question of why an
information possessor may abjure trading totally and sell information only. This contradicts
the central result in Allen (1990). Note, however, that this paper has not dealt with the general
moral hazard problem in Allen (1990).
Comparative statics on the equilibrium are collected in the following proposition.
14
Proposition 4 1. The information seller sells her information to more clients at a lower price, and
14 As part of the proof of Proposition 3, it can be shown that if the seller trades on her own account and dilutes
her information before selling it, as he increases, i.e., as the seller provides more accurate information to her
clients, the number of optimal clients decreases while her total proﬁt increases.
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more accurate.
2. As the precision of liquidity demands improves, the seller’s proﬁt decreases as she charges
lower price for her information while selling it to the to the same number of clients.
3. The increase in the precision of the security’s payo# reduces the seller’s total proﬁt as she sells
her information to a smaller number of clients at a lower price.
As more speculators trade on their information or as their information becomes more
precise, they collectively trade more aggressively, which reduces the seller’s information sales
proﬁt. She is unable to recover all of the loss incurred by the more aggressive trading of
speculators, but she can still retrieve part of the loss by selling her information to more clients
at a lower price, diluting the speculators’ trading proﬁts, and thereby enhancing her share of
the market trading proﬁts.
15
The precision of liquidity demands does not a#ect the seller’s decision on the number of
her clients, but since the market maker gets more accurate information about the payo# of the
security as the precision of liquidity demands improves, the seller’s proﬁt decreases. As the
speculators’ information becomes more accurate or the number of speculators increases, then
the speculators collectively trade more aggressively, which causes information seller’s share of
market proﬁt to shrink as far as the seller still sells her information to the same number of
information buyers. Therefore, the seller’s optimal response is to sell her information to more
clients to prevent her share of market trading proﬁt from decreasing further.
The increases in the precision of security’s payo#, i.e., the decreases in the variance of
security’s payo# cause the seller’s information to be less valuable to potential clients, and
consequently a smaller number of outside investors are willing to purchase information from
the seller, which forces the seller to charge a lower price.
IV. Risk Averse Information Seller and Buyers
In previous sections it is assumed that all the market participants are risk neutral, and the
sale of information enables the risk neutral seller to credibly commit to a strategy that
promotes more intense competition among informed traders and thereby earns her a greater
proﬁt. In this section, the information seller and outside investors are assumed to be risk averse
and the seller’s optimal use of her private information will be analyzed. For the simplicity of
analysis, speculators are still assumed to be risk neutral, and the seller does not add any noise
to the information sold to her clients.
Suppose the information seller and outside investors have quadratic utility functions with
risk aversion coe$cient of g and m respectively. The reservation utility of the outside investors
without purchasing information from the seller is assumed to be zero. If the seller trades on her
own account while selling her information to k clients, expected utility of each information
buyer is
16
15 If the number of speculators is low, then the equilibrium number of information buyers would be also low. In
this case, information buyers have less di$culty in verifying the actual number of clients to whom the seller’s
information is sold.
16 Exact derivations of expected utilities of speculators and information seller are given in the Appendix.
























S(g, m, k) denotes the seller’s total certainty equivalent of her expected utility of
trading and the proceeds from the sales of her information. Since there are su$ciently many
outside investors, the price paid by each information buyer is equal to EUB(g, m, k), and the
information seller’s expected utility is
EP
T
























If the seller decides not to trade on her own account, EPS(m, k) denotes the total proceeds
from selling her information to k clients. Since there are su$ciently large number of outside
investors who are potential clients of the information seller, EPS(m, k)  kEPB(m, k), where
EPB(m, k) is the certainty equivalent of the information buyer’s expected utility of trading on
the basis on the information purchased from the seller.
17 As the next proposition demon-
strates, the seller’s decision on whether or not to trade on her own account depends on the
degree of her risk aversion relative to outside investors’ risk aversion.
Proposition 5 If the information seller is more risk averse than her clients, then it is optimal for
her to commit not to trade on her own account. Otherwise, the seller is better o# by selling her
information while trading on the basis of her information as well.
Proposition 5 can be illustrated by the following equation.
EP
T
S(g, m, k)  ()( k1) EPB(m, k1) if g  () m
If all market participants including the information seller andh er clients are risk neutral,
the sale of information makes the trading strategy oft h especulators less aggressive and increase
hers hare of the market trading proﬁts at the expense of the speculators’ proﬁt. It is this strategic
externality that makes the sales of information an optimal strategy for the risk neutral
information seller. If the seller andh er clients are risk averse, thenb etter risk sharing among the
seller and buyers of information can bea chieved through the sale of information, which is
anotheri ncentive for the sales of private information owned by the seller. Contrary to the case
of risk neutral seller derived in Proposition 1, a risk averse information seller ﬁnds it optimal to
17 If the seller decides not to trade on her own account, then she collects the proceeds from the sales of her
information in period 0, and does not face risk. Therefore, the total proﬁts from the sales of her information does
not depend on her risk aversion.
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The result derived in Proposition 5 is straightforward. The less risk averse a trader is, the
more aggressively he trades based on his private information, and the higher the value of
information is to him. The sales of information has the function of allocating information to
the traders who value the most. If the seller is less risk averse than her clients, the expected
utility from trading on the basis of her information is greater than the price that her clients are
willing to pay for, and therefore it is optimal for her to trade on her own account while selling
her information to her clients. But the opposite is true if the seller is more risk averse. Since
the value of information is higher to her client than to her, the seller can be better o# by selling
her information while committing not to trade at all.




u 1a n dn10. As the seller and her
clients become risk averse, the seller ﬁnds it optimal to sell her information to the greater
number of clients but her expected utility decreases as the value of information to her clients
and herself diminishes.
19
18 This result can be obtained in the context of the model in this paper but the derivation is similar to the one in
Admati & Pﬂeiderer(1988) and omitted.
19 For gm, if the seller decides to trade on her own account while selling her information to k clients, then
there are k1 traders with identical utility functions. It is equivalent to the case that the seller commits not to
trade at all but sells her information to k1 clients. Therefore EP
t
S(m, m, k)EPS(m, k1)(k1)EPB(m, k1)
is obtained, and the seller with g  m is better o# by selling her information without trading on her own account
and thereby earning EPS(m, k1)(k1)EPB(m, k1) instead of being engaged in both sales of information
and trading.
T67A: 1O EI>B6A S6A: D; IC;DGB6I>DC 7N R>H@ AK:GH: S:AA:G ID R>H@ AK:GH: BJN:GH

















































































The ﬁrst number is k*(g, m), optimal number of information buyers for the seller with risk aversion coe$cient
g to the clients with risk aversion coe$cient of m, and the number in the bracket is the seller’s total proﬁts.
For g  m, the seller trades on her own account and sell her information to is k*(g, m) clients. But for g  m,
the seller commits not to trade on her own account but sells her information to k*(m, m)1 clients
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This paper analyzes the direct sales of information in both monopolistic and oligopolistic
markets for ﬁnancial information. For agents with private information, competition based on
information makes the selling of their information more proﬁtable than trading on their own
accounts. Since price cannot reﬂect all the private information held by traders in the market,
information sellers ﬁnd it optimal to sell their information ‘as is’ without adding any noise
before selling it to clients. This is still true even when the seller herself also trades on her own
account.
If a trader who already has private information about a security is allowed to buy
information from the seller, he will never ﬁnd it optimal to do so due to decreasing marginal
returns of information. As more intense competition among traders occurs due to the increase
in the number of traders or the improvement in their information, a seller sells her information
to more clients at a lower price. The model is extended to the case that information seller and
her clients are risk averse. A risk averse seller can achieve better risk sharing through the sales
of information, and the sales of information has the function of allocating information to the
traders who value most.
This paper explores only the issues raised by the direct sales of information. There are
many other ways in which a possessor of valuable information may o#er it for use in trading.
For instance, mutual fund managers sometimes claim to invest their shareholders’ money
based on private information and research, but shareholders of a mutual fund never directly
observe this information. A broader comparison between such di#erent selling methods is
much needed, and this paper is best viewed as a ﬁrst step.
Another important issue in this context concerns the incentive problems of sellers. It is
assumed both that the statistical properties of a seller’s information are common knowledge,
and that truthful communication can be guaranteed. This paper demonstrates, however, that
a risk neutral information seller need not trade to maximize her proﬁt if her information is
truthfully communicated. This, clearly, is not a complete solution to the general incentive
problems. A more detailed appraisal of these issues in an integrated framework remains a topic
for further research.
AEE:C9>M
Proof of Proposition 1 The seller’s problem is to decide the optimal m* to maximize mP[m
(n, hh)] given (n, hh). If there is no speculator, i.e., n0o rhh0, then from equation (5),
m*1 is obtained, which means that the seller trades on her information instead of selling it.




therefore the seller obtains higher proﬁts by selling her information.
Proof of Proposition 2 Suppose the seller provides information of precision he at the price of
P
*
i by adding personalized noise to her information, and in equilibrium k clients are specula-
tors, and z are outside investors. These speculators observe two noisy signals of u . , and if e . l’s
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price schedule P(y ˜ )u 2 ly ˜ , the speculators who purchase information from the seller submit
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Since there are su$ciently many outside investors as potential clients of the seller, given
the price of information and conjectured number of speculators who purchase information
from the seller, the equilibrium number of outside investors who become the clients of the





ub(k, z). However, from equation (8), it is shown that the following inequality
always holds for any z and k.
P
ib(k, z)P* i  P
ib(k, z) P
ub(k, z)  P
i(k, z)
Therefore, no speculator buys extra information from the seller regardless of the precision
of the information.
Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose the seller provides information of precision he to m clients by
adding personalized noise, and she trades on her own account as well. Given the price schedule
P(y ˜ )u 2 l




(u . u 2 ), (A.1)
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s [(m, he)(n, hh)] increases in he, and selling her information ‘as
is’ maximizes her total proﬁts.
Proof of Proposition 4 From the proof of Proposition 1, it is known that optimal m* is derived



















By using the solution of the quadratic equation, m* is derived, which increases in both n and
hh but decreases in hu. Thanks to the envelope theorem, it can be shown that the price charged
by the seller and her total proﬁt decrease in n, hh and hu. Since equation (A.4) does not contain
hu, m* is not a#ected by the precision of liquidity demands, but equation(5) shows that the
seller’s proﬁt is monotonically decreasing in it.
Proof of Proposition 5 Utility function of information seller is denoted US while that of
information buyer is denoted UB. Suppose information seller trades on her own account while
selling her information to k clients. Given the price schedule of P  u 2 ly ˜and u . , information
seller, her clients and speculators are believed to be taking the trading strategies of a (u . u 2 ),
b(u . u 2 )a n dd(u . u 2 ) respectively. Taking the price schedule of P  u 2 ly ˜ , u .and trading
strategies of information seller and speculators, the information seller’s optimal trading order
is derived from the solution of the following maximization problem.
ma
xx E[USu . ]
ma
xxE[x(u . u 2 l(xkb(u . u 2 )nd(u . u 2 )u ˜ ))u . ]
 g
2
Var[x(u . u 2 l(xkb(u . u 2 )nd(u . u 2 )u ˜ ))u . ]





(1klbnld)(u . u 2 )
where s
2
u  1/hu. For the market’s belief on the seller’s trading strategy to be consistent,
following equality should hold.





Each of information buyers solves following maximization problem given the price schedule,
u .and trading strategies of information seller, speculators and other information buyers.
ma
z x E[UBu . ]
ma
z x E[z(u . u 2 l(za(u . u 2 )(k1)b(u . u 2 )nd(u . u 2 )u ˜ ))u . ]
 m
2
Var[z(u . u 2 l(za(u . u 2 )(k1)b(u . u 2 )nd(u . u 2 )u ˜ ))u . ]





(1la(k1)lbnld)(u . u 2 )
 b(u . u 2 )





The trading order submitted by each of speculators is the solution of following maximization
problem taking the price schedule, u .and trading strategies of information seller, information
buyers, and other speculators.
ma
wx E[w(u . u 2 l(a(u . u 2 )kb(u . u 2 )(n1)d(u . u 2 )u ˜ ))u . ]




 d(u . u 2 )
 d  1
l(n1)
(1laklb) (A.7)
Solutions of simultaneous equations of (A.5), (A.6) and (A.7) produce the equilibrium


































Due to the zero expected proﬁt condition of market maker, the equilibrium l*(g, m, k)i s
determined from following equation.
























u  1/hu. From equation (A.9), it can be shown that l*(g, m, k) increases in g.
Expected utility of each information buyer is

































Since there are su$ciently many outside investors, the price paid by each information buyer is
equal to EUB(g, m, k), and the information seller’s expected utility is
EP
T
S(g, m, k)  EUS(g, m, k)kEUB(g, m, k)
where
































From equations (10) and (12), it can be shown that EP
T
S(g, m, k) decreases in l and g. Since
l* is an increasing function of g, EP
T
S(g, m, k) decreases in g. EPB(m, h) denotes the price
charged to each information buyer if the seller’s information is sold to h clients while the seller
commits not to trade on her own account. In this case, the seller gains the total proﬁt of EPS
(m, h)  hEPB(m, h) regardless of g.F o rg  m, if the seller trades on her own account while
selling her information to k clients, then there are k1 informed traders with identical risk
aversion, which is equivalent to the seller’s information sold to k1 clients while the seller
committing not to trade. Therefore, EP
T
S(g, m, k)  (k1) EUB(g, m, k)  (k1)EPB(m, k
1) holds for g  m. Since EP
T




S(g, m, k)  ()( k1)EPB(m, k1) if g  () m
and the result follows.
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